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Abstract
A nthony D owns (1957), in his celebrated w ork, 'An Economic 
Theory o f  Democracy', argued, that parties w ere political firm s in 
business o f  selling packages o f  policies in order to m axim ise votes 
so as to be able to win and enjoy the fru its  o f  govern m ent office. 
W hile on the other hand voters were political consum ers, using 
their votes as political currency to purchase the pu blic policies on 
offer at a general election. These voters were not tied to any party 
but they were rational, maximising, free-th in kin g  and were 
determ ined to gain maximum return by voting fo r  a party  o f  their 
choice. These voters elect a party that offered them the best policy 
package at the lowest tax cost. As it will becom e clear in this 
paper, most o f  the rural voters from  61 constituencies out o f  a total 
o f  80 in 2007 Lesotho election, elected Lesotho Congress for 
Dem ocracy (LCD) probably on the basis o f  D owns' observations 
above. LCD popularised fr ee  education and a pension scheme 
policies fo r  the elderly who had never been em ployed before. The 
task o f  this paper is to evaluate this perception in relation to the 
rational choice theory. The paper will also assess the rational 
choice model in line with the above description  to ascertain 
whether the LCD, a party that has been w inning elections in 
Lesotho from  1998 to 2007 has been voted on the basis o f  this 
model. The paper does not claim  that rational choice model will 
provide a definitive answ er to this project, but it w ill attempt to 
analyse patterns that may appear to reflect som e sim ilarities with 
the model. However, this would not mean that, by testing this 
model on LCD policies, the model is beyond criticism  since
rational model is noted fo r  its com plexities when applied to 
empirical cases.
Introduction
Any assessm ent of political parties m ust take into 
consideration that a political party "refers to an association 
of citizens w ho share a set of basic political view s that they 
seek to advance by presenting candidates for elective 
offices" (Ceaser, 1990:96). Political parties m ust therefore, be 
able to respond to the voters' interests and expectations. 
This is because, "p olitica l parties constitute an im portant 
element of m odern governm ent" (N noli, 1986:139). It is only 
political parties w ithin society, am ong other social groups, 
which are able to form  m odern governm ents, which 
translate voters' in terests into national policies. It is for this 
reason that parties com pete for power. Sim ilarly, for 
political parties to "w in  elections they m ust attract support 
from many d ifferent groups in the electorate" (Crew, 
1993:83). This m eans that they m ust bring both their current 
and prospective vo ter's  interests together and create 
consensus across a large segm ent of the population. The 
major reason is that voting is the m ain aim  of an individual 
to register his opin ion  regarding his understanding of a 
particular political system . The voter learns these opinions 
within his fam ily and his environm ent, and upon reaching 
political m aturity, she/he tends to identify with various 
socio-economic interests. W hen individuals vote, their vote 
becomes "an  exp ression  of individual view s of their political 
outlook" (Rose, 1990: 28). It is this outlook which has played 
a major role in voting behaviour, because " even in the 
absence of p>arties, electors m ay still vote expressively, using 
the ethnicity, gender, or religion of C andidates to identify 
the Candidate w ho best represents an individual's outlook 
formed through a lifetim e of learning " (Rose, 1990: 29).
The paper is d ivided into five sections. The next section 
below provides a contextual background about Lesotho's 
electoral politics. The third section discusses the LCD
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policies w hich the party sold to the voters during the 2006 
cam paign. The fourth section focuses specifically  on the 
factors that m ight have given the LCD this victory. These 
include but not lim ited to the position o f an incum bency, the 
weak financial status of the opposition parties, a factor that 
m ight have played a major role in inhibiting these parties 
cam paigning strategy, the legacy and influence of the late 
Dr. Ntsu M okhehle, the rational choice m od el which 
attem pts to explain in an approxim ated m anner why the 
LCD has been able to win this election. The con clu sion  sums 
up the m ain argum ent of the debates.
Background
Since the 1998 election in Lesotho, one party appears to be 
not only dom inating the political landscape, but also 
w inning every election. The Lesotho C ongress for 
dem ocracy (LCD), form ed barely eight m onths before the 
1998 election, went on to w in this election. The party 
continued to win both the 2002 election and the 2007 snap 
elections with a wide m argin despite the fact that it 
fragm ented twice into two parties, the Lesotho Peoples' 
Congress in Septem ber 2001 and the A ll Basotho 
Convention (ABC) in O ctober 2006. N onetheless, in 2007 
LCD form ed an election pact w ith N ational Independent 
Party (NIP). This party has w on these elections 
notw ithstanding the fact that it had been labelled as a party 
with a poor service delivery record in 2006 (Public Eye2006). 
This inefficiency even forced the A BC leader to form  his 
own party and thus disassociated h im self from  the LCD 
(Public Eye2006). Like the past three elections in Lesotho, 
they were conducted in an atm osphere of peace and 
tranquillity. In fact, they were declared free and fair by most 
observers (M atlosa, 2007). For exam ple, both dom estic and 
international observers "declared the electoral process as 
credible and its outcom e as legitim ate" (M atlosa, 2007:16). 
Despite the above declarations, it is im portan t to indicate 
that there were some claim s received by the Independent
152 Review o f Southern African Studies Vol. 12, No. 1 & 2, 2008
Electoral C om m ission  that som e M inisters were seen 
conveying voters to polling centres. H ow ever, the quick 
action by the I EC officials at both Tse'nola and Lovely Rock 
polling stations w ere able to put a stop to this practice 
which contravened the electoral code of conduct. The two 
M inisters in question lost their constituencies to the 
opposition in the end. It was how ever, not clear w hether 
they lost because people w ere also against their actions or 
whether it w as because voters in these constituencies had 
already m ade up their m inds to vote for other parties.
Few m onths after the 2007 elections, several parties 
lodged petitions with and against the IEC as well as 
applications before the High C ourt of Lesotho. All these 
were m protest against w hat was then grievances arising 
from the elections activities as table 1 below  show s;
The Electoral Process and the 2007 Snap election 153
254 Review o f Southern African Studies Vol. 12, No. 2 & 2, 2008
T ab lel: List of Elections Petitions
PETITION MATTER RESULTS
Petition 01 /07 IEC/LWP
Qhalasi Constituency
Dismissed with 
costs
Petition 02/07 IEC/Molapo
Thaba-Putsoa
Constituency
Dismissed with 
costs
Petition 03/07 IEC/Tsolo
Mafeteng Constituency
Dismissed with
costs
Petition 04/07 IEC/Rafoneke 
Machache Constituency
Dismissed with 
costs
Petition05/07 IEC/ Mokhosi 
Bela-Bela Constituency
Dismissed with 
costs
Petition 06/07 IEC/Tsiu
Kolonyama
Constituency
Dismissed with
costs
CIV/APN/116/07 IEC/MFP Dismissed with
costs
CIV/APN/170/07 IEC/ABC IEC served 
Applicant with 
its answer on 
the 7th June 
2007. Applicant 
did not reply. 
IEC would then 
force matters.
Source: IEC, 2007
All these cases were dism issed w ith costs excep t the case 
involving IEC and ABC w hich is still in cou rt as reflected in 
table 1 above. W hat was w orthy of note also w as the role of 
Independent Electoral C om m ission w hich ensured that 
voters and parties alike, have access to unrestricted 
inform ation regarding this election. For the first tim e since 
1993, the Independent Electoral C om m ission  (IEC) 
appointed a three-m an-M edia M onitoring Panel (MMP) to 
facilitate free access of all the political parties to the national 
media. The Panel ensured that "a ll contesting  political
parties have equal access to the public m edia as provided 
for in the N ational election laws especially section 47 K (1) 
of N ational A ssem bly A ct 1992 which states that, "every  
political party shall have the right to have the substance of 
its cam paign propaganda reported on news broadcasts of 
G overnm ent-ow ned national m edia and in any new spaper 
in circulation in Lesotho" (N ational A ssem bly Election Act, 
1992).
A series o f election  developm ent policy debates on both 
state controlled  radios and television (February 3 & 10, 2007) 
among the Leaders of seven m ajor political parties which 
had nom inated m ore than 40 candidates for the 2007 
elections w ere facilitated to provide even m ore coverage for 
eligible voters to understand each p arty 's m anifestos 
(Santho, Likoti and Sello, 2007). The television debates were 
carried out live on Lesotho television and Radio Lesotho. 
The purpose w as to ensure that voters understood 
thoroughly w hat political parties w ere saying so that they 
could m ake inform ed choices. This w as equally im portant 
because the 2007 election  was a snap election. Therefore, 
voters had to be assisted to have unrestricted access to a free 
and fair m edia that provided them  w ith alternative 
impartial inform ation.
The 17th February 2007 election in Lesotho was 
undoubtedly one of the m ost extraordinary in recent 
Lesotho history. This w as so for four m ajor reasons as 
follows: first, for the first time in the political history of 
Lesotho, the country  w as faced with snap elections as a 
direct consequence of fragm entation of the ruling party in 
parliament. Follow ing this fragm entation in O ctober 2006, 
the Prime M inister o f Lesotho was forced to call for snap 
elections. The breakaw ay party, the All Basotho Convention 
(ABC), left the governm ent of Pakalitha M osisili with the 
slimmest of m ajorities in the 120-m em ber cham ber. The 
ABC was form ed w ith 18 m em bers of all form er LCD 
parliam entarians w ho had gained access to parliam ent 
through First Past the Post (FPTP) electoral system . This
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crossing of the floor by the ABC m otivated the governing 
party that was left with 62 m em bers of p arliam ent to call for 
snap election.
Second, the ABC was led by form er C om m unications 
M inister Thom as Thabane who was popularly  know n as 
"M r delivery" within the LCD governm ent and in some 
quarters. Thabane was able to generate unprecedented 
interest am ong prospective voters and injected 
'developm ental issues' into the cam paign, a new  feature in 
Lesotho politics. Third, this was an election  that provided a 
rare com petitive challenge to the party that has ruled the 
country for a decade with no credible challenger around. 
The LCD hegem ony appeared to be facing a determined 
onslaught from  its splinter party, the ABC.
Finally, this was the election, w hich had the poorest 
voter turnout in the past three elections (1993, 1998 and 
2002). For instance, out of a population estim ated  at 2.2 
million people, 916230 had registered to cast their votes. 
However, only less than half of the registered  voters 
m anaged to cast their ballots in 2552 polling stations around 
the country, accounting for a d isappointing figure of 442,963 
that had voted. Despite this apparent voter apathy the LCD, 
went on to win 61 out of 80 constituencies. Furtherm ore, out 
of 19 political parties that had registered  w ith the 
Independent Electoral C om m ission (IEC), only 14 contested 
elections. This was another clear reflection  that it was not 
only the voters who were apathetic, but also political parties 
lacked interest to participate in this election. To the 
consternation of the opinion pollsters, like 'W o rk  for Justice 
and the Public Eye new spapers,' w hose findings throughout 
the cam paign had predicted an A BC victory  over the LCD, 
these predictions were proved w rong. Table 2 below 
illustrates the scale of LCD victory in 2007 election;
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T a b l e  2: T he 2007 Lesotho G eneral Elections
Year M ain Parties No. of Votes % of Votes No, of Seats
2007 L C D /N IP 229,602 68.9 82
A B C /L W P 107.463 22.7 27
BNP 29,965 2. .5 3
ACP 20,263 1.7 2
PFD 15,477 0.8 1
BCP 9,823 0.8 1
MFP 9,129 0.8 1
BDNP 8,783 0.8 1
BBDP 8,474 0.8 1
N LFP 3,984 0.0 0
Total 442,963 100% 119
Source: Lesotho Independent Electoral Com m ission
The LCD secured a conform able 61 seats, and its alliance 
partner, the N IP got 21 proportional seats that accounted for 
82 seats in parliam ent. The LC D /N IP alliance accounted for 
68.9 percent w hile the ABC and its coalition partner, the 
Lesotho W orkers Party (LW P) got away w ith 17 
constituencies. The Lesotho W orkers' Party got 10 
proportional seats, w hich cam e to 27 seats. The Basotho 
National Party (BN P), a traditional rival of the LCD 
emerged fifth  w ith a poor show ing of 3 proportional 
representation seats. The LCD victory surprised many 
because of the then unfriendly circum stances that m ade this 
victory unfeasible as the above m entioned pollsters had 
predicted. The LC D 's success w as achieved in m ost 
unfavourable circum stances.
First, Lesotho w as in a grip of the longest unem ploym ent 
rate since the early  1980s. The ABC m anifesto argued that, 
unem ploym ent w as ram pant and stood at "45  percent, with 
high child labour, 50 percent of the population live below 
the poverty line and the U nited N ations has described 40 
percent of the p opu lation  as ultra poor, m eaning that they
cannot afford food" (ABC, 2007:5). In fact the M inister of 
Finance in his 2007 budget speech corroborated  the ABC 
claim  that the country was facing an econom ic catastrophe 
of major proportion:
this unprecedented deterioration in the land and its 
people has ushered in a crisis in the social and moral 
fabric o f  our society. U nem ploym ent is high, and 
poverty is deepening; stock theft and arm ed robbery  
have become the order o f  the day; corruption and 
nepotism are spreading like a cancer in ou r institutions; 
and there is no doubt that life is becom ing harder by the 
day fo r  an increasing num ber o f  our people (Lesotho 
Governm ent Budget speech 2007:3).
Furtherm ore, traditional sources of household  incomes, 
agriculture and m igrant work, had been declining. Migrant 
Labour had also declined from  126,000 in 1987 to 52,000 at 
the end of 2006. Prospects for agriculture as high yielding 
enterprises were also threatened by drought and climate 
change (Lesotho G overnm ent Budget speech, 2007). In fact, 
Lesotho, according to the Finance M inister, has been losing 
the global race for jobs, high, broad-based and sustainable 
econom ic grow th and poverty eradication to other countries 
in SACU, SA D C, Africa and Asia (Lesotho Governm ent 
Budget speech, 2007). Despite these econom ic hardships, the 
LCD still w on the election.
Second, lir e  Prim e M inister had earlier castigated civil 
servants for not being loyal to the governm ent, saying that 
they appeared to be attending opposition parties' rallies. He 
boasted that the governm ent have sufficient support in the 
country and as such he did not depend on C ivil servants 
votes (Public Eye, 2006: 10). He boldly m ade this statement 
even though there was no way of know ing w hether they 
voted for him  or not in the last election (2002). This outburst 
was precipitated by concerns that the governm ent was not 
delivering services. The civil servants w ere, therefore, 
singled out as scape-goats for governm ent failure to deliver
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services (A BC , 2007).
Third, the governm ent had earlier introduced what 
appears to m ost people the m ost unpopular policy that was 
meant to ben efit the M inisters and Senior G overnm ent 
Officials (Public Eye, 2006:2). This policy, allow ed the 
government M inisters to purchase M ercedes Benz luxury 
cars for M 4000.00 and 'Toyota C am ries for civil servants in 
statutory positions for M 2000.00 (G overnm ent of Lesotho 
2006). The Im perial Fleet Services C om pany previously 
loaned the veh icles to the governm ent. These vehicles were 
supposed to be sold to these officials after three years in 
government operation. The vehicle schem e furore appears 
to have left a legacy of resentm ent in a large proportion of 
the urban voters. This can be deduced from  the fact that, for 
the first tim e since LCD cam e to pow er, it lost all 
constituencies in the capital, M aseru. Subsequent to the 
above outcry, the governm ent dispatched a group of senior 
Ministers to the national television in A ugust 2006. They 
were to defend the above decision as a legitim ate 
government policy. This w as not w ithstanding the fact that 
the benefits that w ent to tw enty-six M inisters appeared to 
be meagre, in com parison  w ith world standards. Lesotho 
with a sm all econom y and w ith econom ic grow th (real GDP 
growth) of 4.5 percent for 2006 (FAO, 2007) and now here 
near m acro-econom ic target of 7percent per annum , these 
benefits w ere perceived as substantial.
In retrospect, around N ovem ber 1998, Rakoro Phororo, 
had published an article in the local N ew spaper, M ophem e- 
The Survivor, w here he strongly disagreed with Prime 
Minister (PM ) M osisili's  governm ent policy of granting the 
then Prime M inister N tsu M okhehle a M ercedes Benz under 
what now appears to have been sim ilar a circum stance. He 
wrote:
■ ■■in a poor country such as Lesotho, this precedent will 
ever he the main m otive fo r  political leaders to aspire to 
prem iership at all costs, even at the expense o f  sacrificing
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principles, conscience, political values, and reconciliation.
The dilem m a o f  mediocre political leaders that Lesotho is 
presently experiencing will thus get w orse in the years 
ahead (M ophem e-The Surv ivorl998  Tuesday, O ctober27- 
N ovem ber 02)
Phororo's predictions could not be far from  correct. The 
irony is that, Phororo had been appointed  a M inister of 
A griculture (in the 2002 cabinet), and w as now  part of a 
group, which allocated vehicles to senior civ il servants and 
M inisters. During the above television  in terview , one of the 
M inisters in reply to questions put to him  by journalists was 
dism issive about the w hole furore. D espite several public 
protestations regarding the m anner in w hich the above 
vehicles w ere acquired, the PM, in one of his utterances in 
M arch 2006, inform ed the public gathering  in Berea that 
some people appeared to be m aking unnecessary  noise 
about the governm ent vehicles schem e. He w ent on to argue 
that "Ketla Ba Busa Ho Fihlela Ba Tloaela. Ea Belelang a eo 
bollella Khaitseli ea M alom 'ae'". (M eaning that I will reign 
on you until you are accustom ed to my premiership. 
W hoever is in doubt should protest to his uncle). What 
appears to have been unfortunate on the part of the 
governm ent has been its failure to acknow ledge that 
governm ent property cannot be transferred to individuals in 
such a m anner. The governm ent is not a corporation  but a 
public entity. G overnm ent properties are normally 
auctioned publicly and proceeds derived th ereof channelled 
to the public purse, not kept for the benefits of some 
individuals in pow erful positions. M in ister Phororo in his 
article above in relation to this governm ent policy of the 
current PM lam ented in 1998 that:
i f  I was a leader o f  a governm ent that is sensitw e to 
human misery and national econom ic tragedy, such as 
has befallen Lesotho, I and my colleagues w ould  humbly 
approach our predecessor (PM  M okhehle) and plead with 
him fo r  us to at least postpone gran tin g  o f  an expensive
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car until the econom ic situation im proves.(M ophem e-The
S u n n vorl998  Tuesday, O ctober27-N ovem her 02).
Since Phororo w rote the above article in 1998, econom ic 
misery in L esotho has becom e w orse to say the least. He 
was against the granting of one car, yet he has becom e mute 
about the allocation  of tw enty six M ercedes Benze cars to 
Ministers of w hich  he has recently becom e a m em ber and 
over ten C am ry cars to senior civil servants. He did not 
suggest for the postponem ent he eloquently advocated for 
above w hen M okhehle was given a car. He did not even 
persuade his co lleagu es that w hat they w ere doing was 
wrong despite the current econom ic w retchedness that has 
befallen Lesotho. This vehicle schem e led to the creation of a 
popular p erception  w hich Bratton and Van de W alle 
equated to that w hich prevailed in the early 1990s whereby 
citizen opined that those "w ith  access to political power 
were living high on the hog w hile ordinary people 
suffered"(Bratton and Van de W alle 1997:99).
The LCD Policies and the 2006 Cam paign
It would appear that, the key to the LCD success, centred on 
the party's ability  to convince sufficient voters that both the 
pension and ed u cation  policies especially free education 
policy w ere extrem ely  im portant provided that the 
incumbent governm ent rem ained in office. A ccording to 
Work for Justice (2006), the governm ent of Lesotho in 2004 
introduced an O ld age pension of M l50 per m onth paid to 
over 70 year o lds elderly  people, the m ajority of which live 
in the rural areas. This pension schem e becam e a cam paign 
tool for the LC D  for the 2007 elections (2007 Election 
manifesto of the LCD  2007). The elderly m en and wom en 
who can no longer help them selves w ere also prom ised to 
be paid M 200 per m onth an increase of M 50 if they re­
elected the LCD. The m anifesto argued that the party values 
them greatly because they still possessed a lot of w isdom  
and insights. The party also prom ised to deliberate on how
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the facilities at Pay-Points can be im proved in order to 
facilitate the elderly 's easy access (2007 E lection  m anifesto of 
the LCD 2007). It can be assum ed for that reason that, most 
rural people in the 2007 election appeared to have voted 
according to their econom ic interests, w hich w ere primarily 
influenced by the above LCD m anifesto.
The LCD has alw ays popularised the old pension 
schem e. M ajority of the beneficiaries of the pension  scheme 
have not contributed to it. M ost of them  have never worked 
for governm ent before. On the other hand, retired civil 
servants are not entitled to receive this old age pension. It 
has been tailor m ade exclusively for those w ho w ere not 
earning any pension before. This schem e has succeeded in 
raising individual expectations, a factor that can be 
attributed to the LCD electoral success. The pension  scheme, 
despite its shortcom ings, am ong other issues rem ained the 
m ain attraction am ong rural voters. Eventually , "one way in 
w hich this pocket-book effect is m anifested is through the 
level of optim ism  that people exhibit about their financial 
prospects" (King, 1992:177). The critical question, o f course, 
is how far these changes in individual econom ic expectation 
m ight have affected the popularity of the LC D  government. 
There are certainly good reasons for supposing that they 
may have done so.
In assessing the rational choice m odel for the above 
period it was evident that there was an em erging  pattern in 
support of the m odel am ong different groups. The LCD 
achieved a decisive shift of votes from  voters w ho voted on 
their econom ic preferences, m ore especially  on pension 
factor, w hich strongly favoured the party. A ided by some of 
the sym pathetic N ational radio station like M oAfricn  FM and 
Radio Lesotho earlier before the Election Day w as declared, 
the LCD m ade pension a m ajor issue. This w as congruent 
with RCM  theorists who alw ays "d raw  attention  to the 
significance of issue voting and argue that issues do matter 
precisely because policy preferences determ ines the 
direction of vote choice and not the other w ay around
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(Dearlove and Saunders, 2000:164). It is clear that both 
pension and free education policies w ere im portant issues 
among the voters, m ore especially the rural voters in 
Lesotho w here LCD w on all constituencies.
W hile the LCD has been widely criticised for failing to 
deliver on prom ises of job creation, econom ic grow th and 
success against H IV /A ID S (the ABC M anifesto 2006), it has 
urged voters to back it with plans to increase old age 
pensions. M any studies of relationship betw een econom ics 
and political support have distinguished betw een
sociotrop ic' and 'egocentric' motivations. Voters act 
sociotropically  to the extent that their political 
judgem en t depends on their assessm ent o f  w hether the 
governm ent's econom ic perform ance has been good or 
bad fo r  the country as a whole (S a n d ers l9 9 3 :179).
The pension schem e in Lesotho is indicative of this 
statement. It w as clear that no m atter how the governm ent 
record had been, this was not an im portant factor to the 
voters. W hat was im portant was the econom ic status 
regardless of how  m eagre the m onthly pension of M 150 
was. Their expression  was unequivocal in the voting booth 
thus: T feel good about my ow n prospects, therefore, I feel 
good about the LCD governm ent, irrespective of w hat other 
parties have been saying '. The LCD governm ent has also 
been able to m aintain  inflation at 5 percent and anticipated 
3.5 percent econom ic grow th during this fiscal year (Public 
eye2007 February 23). It was prim arily for econom ic reasons 
that the voters rew arded the party in office w ith their votes. 
They saw it as better than other parties in m anaging the 
economy, p roducing econom ic prosperity, a sense of w ell­
being, and the feel-good factor. A ccording to RCM , voters 
are prepared to re-elect the governm ent if they feel that it 
manages the econom y in such a way that their future and 
their ch ild ren 's future w ill be bright. Form er British Prim e 
Minister, H arold W ilson, from  the Labour party in 1968, 
argued that, "a ll political history show s that the standing of
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the governm ent and its ability to hold the con fid en ce of the 
electorate at a general election depends on the success of its 
econom ic policy" (D earlove and Saunders, 2000:168). The 
LCD in Lesotho appears to have done just that.
The LCD governm ent had earlier aim ed to provide 
equitable universal basic education to all. In 2000, it 
introduced a program m e of free prim ary edu cation , which 
was to be im plem ented gradually for over a seven-year 
period. For the 2007 elections, the party  (LC D ) also 
prom ised to expand free education for second ary  school 
pupil and provide books for stud ent from  poor 
backgrounds (Election m anifesto of the LCD 2007). Free 
education rem ained as popular as ever am ong the poor 
peasants in the country. This is because w hen stakes are 
high rationality kicks in; this was evident in the 2007 snap 
elections. Stakes are alw ays high in every election , hence 
whv m ost people thought they w ere going to lose both these 
policies if they voted for a different party. The defining 
feature of rational choice theory is that people alw ays try to 
m axim ize their interests w hen it com es to things like whom 
to vote for or w hether to volunteer politically. It was for this 
reason that both the pension and free ed u cation  policies 
rem ained high am ong the rural voters. The approach has 
many variants. Decision theory, for exam ple, centres on 
cost-benefit calculations that individuals m ake without 
reference to anyone else's plans. It can be assum ed maybe 
correctly that voters based their decision  centred  on cost- 
benefit analysis.
Furtherm ore, governm ent has since 2000 financed free 
prim ary education program m es, w hich saw  the first batch 
graduate at the end of 2006. In fact, in order to strengthen 
the im provem ent of education at all levels, the LCD 
governm ent further prom ised to allocate M 88.4 million to 
finance activities in the education sector, including 
provision of infrastructure for the 2007 financial year 
(Thahane, 2007). The above situation w as sim ilar to that of 
Britain in the early 1990s, w here it w as found that "voters
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would su p p ort the party that would put m ost m oney into 
their pockets. This notion of pocketbook voting, or econom ic 
voting, is a m ore closely specified version of issue voting" 
(Dearlove and Saund ers, 2000:167). The rural voters in 
Lesotho perceived them selves as m aking a lot of savings 
from LCD policies. First, they did not have to pay fees for 
their children at prim ary school level. Second, they were 
being prom ised not to pay for books for their secondary 
school ch ild ren  as w ell. Third, they w ere still enjoying the 
M l50 m onthly  pension. Finally, they were promised a 
further increase of M 50 for their pension. It can be argued 
strongly that RCM  w as very m uch at work in Lesotho 
during the 2007 election. V oters saw LCD governm ent as 
putting m ore m oney in their pockets.
A m ong other achievem ents for w hich the LCD 
government praised itself during the election cam paign 
were the fo llow ing; it had entrenched dem ocracy, 
empowered w om en in local governm ent, helped to 
introduce 10 private radio and television stations, built rural 
roads and created  30,000 new  jobs in the past five years 
(Election m anifesto  of the LCD 2007). The party also agued 
that in recen t years, garm ent m anufacturing has been the 
key driver o f grow th, recording sharp grow th of 53 percent 
in 2001 and m aintaining strong pace until 2004, before 
stalling in 2005, as a result of strong com petition from  Asia 
and the ap p reciation  of the Rand/Loti (Thahane 2007). 
Government took steps to counteract the loss of jobs. In 
particular, to im prove the financial position of firms, a 
supportive tax regim e w as introduced in 2006/2007(Election 
manifesto o f the LC D  2007). This action on its ow n was an 
indication that the governm ent econom ic m anagem ent 
strategy, w as im proving and this m ade m ost voters 
optimistic about their future econom ic w ell-being about 
their econom ic prospects. Firm  level training was also 
introduced to boost em ployee productivity. Strong support 
was also received  from  US im porters who have developed 
innovative program m es for im proving production and
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reversing the effects of HIV and A ID S, and continuing 
im ports from  Lesotho producers (Thahane, 2007).
The LCD has pointed tow ard its foreign policy  success, 
even though this item did not form  a m ajor cam paigning 
issue. Lesotho is currently the chair of SA D C  and it has sent 
both police and m ilitary observers to D arfur, Sudan. 
Lesotho, under the governm ent of LCD is also a m em ber of 
A frican U nion Security Com m ittee. The Prim e M inister is on 
record for pointing out that his party has brou gh t peace and 
stability in the country (Election m anifesto  of the LCD 2007). 
As Chair of the SA D C  region, Lesotho is driv ing a process of 
scaling up regional econom ic integration. In less than one 
year, the SA D C will launch a Free-Trade A rea (FTA ) within 
which m em ber states will trade w ith each other duty-free 
and quota-free. This will raise significantly  the Intra-SADC 
trade, which now stands around 25 percent (Election 
m anifesto of the LCD 2007). W ith a popu lation  of over 235 
million, this would present Lesotho w ith a huge m arket that 
would drive its econom ic grow th rate to a sustainable 7% 
per annum  (Election m anifesto of the LCD, 2007). These 
were som e of the associated factors w hich  m ight have 
assisted the party even though they did not feature 
prom inently during the cam paign unlike the two policies 
discussed above.
N onetheless, the party, w hich is likely to w in elections, is 
evaluated on its "perform ance or party p rog ram " (Peele et 
al 1992:64), m ore especially during the by-elections or by 
frequently holding the governm ent accou ntable on all 
fronts. It is fair to assum e that the LC D  apart from 
articulating the above policies, has been able to keep the 
m om entum  unlike other parties in contesting  every by- 
election. This has enabled it to m ake its supp orters not to 
forget it. Table three that follow s illustrates the scale of the 
LCD victories in all by-elections.
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Table: 3 Lesotho Parliamentary by-elections from 
February 2003 to February 2005
C onstituency
Election
Date
Parties
Participated
Registered
voters
Total
Votes
V oter 
Turnout
Winner
Motete
15-Fcb-
2003
M FP, PFD, 
LCD, BAG, 
INDF.PFNDF 
NT*2.
11,768 3,945 34%
LCD
Qhonli
2 3-Aug- 
2003
LPC,LCD,PFD  
, MFP. 10,929
3,516 32%
LCD
Kh.i fung 23-Aug- 2003
PFD, LCD, 
I. PC,
NIP.L.WP,BCP 
, M IP.
11,391
4,280 38% LCD
Thaba-l’u tso a 24-Jan- 2004
MFP, LCD, 
PFD, LVVP, 
UP.
13,319 3,353 25% LCD
Motimposo 24-A pr-
2004
NIP, BCP, 
PFD, LCD, 
NI.FP, MFP, 
1 VVP
13,125
1,712 13%
LCD
Mohobollo 5-Jun-2(XH
PFD,MFP, 
LCD,NIP, 
INDF.PF.NDF 
NT*2.
9,999
1,690 17%
LCD
Qhoali 16 -O c t-  2004
BCP, LCD.
11,820
3,155 27%
LCD
Koro-Kuro 12-Feb- 
2005
LCD, NIP, 
PFD. 9,186
2,542 28%
LCD
QAI .0 04-O CT-
2005
LCD,PFD,NIP
i n d f .p f :n d f ;
NT*4
7,291 856 14% LCD
1 LFBAKHNG 22-APR- 
2006
LCD 3,867
U nopp 
osed
Unoppos
ed LCD
Source: In d ep en d en t E lectoral C om m ission
Judging from  several by-elections held since 2002 and the 
recent general elections, voters' participation has drastically 
declined. The apparent LCD victory in these by-elections as 
illustrated by table 3 is a reflection of the party 's strength of 
its past record, a feature w hich also fits the rational choice 
model. Som e O p p osition  parties have boycotted these by- 
elections, still this gave LCD m ore m ileage over them. For 
instance, on the 25th A pril 2005, a m em ber of the ruling LCD 
for Lebakeng constituency  was sw orn into parliam ent as a 
new MP. W hat was significant about the sw earing in of Mr.
Tse'm ane Sekatle was that he got into parliam ent 
unopposed. W hile m ost o f these by-elections w ere won by 
the ruling LCD, it was nevertheless w ith a very  low margin 
as illustrated in table 3 above because there w as no credible 
contender.
Factors that led to the V ictory of LCD  in 2007 Elections
Several factors were alleged to have assisted  this party 
(LCD) to win the elections. C hief am ong these was the 
incum bency. The fact that LCD was a ru ling party, it had 
occupied the m ost advantageous position. It w as this 
position w hich enabled the party to cam paign  using state 
resources across the country unlike the op position  parties 
which had none and depended on m eagre resources from 
their supporters' subscriptions. A fter the 2002 election, the 
ruling party introduced constituency secretaries for all the 
m em bers of Parliam ent w'ho won the constituencies. This 
ensured that in all these 80 constituencies, there is a paid up 
secretary who serves m em bers of Parliam ent including one 
opposition m em ber w ho won one constituency. This made 
certain that the ruling party w ith its 79 M Ps is able to 
function at the grassroots level unlike m ost opposition 
parties with their 40 Proportional R epresentation  (PR) MPs 
w hom  the governm ent did not extend this financial facility. 
In am ending the 1998 M em bers of parliam ent Salaries Act in 
2003, the governm ent argued that, "Proportional 
representation M Ps do not represent the electorate but their 
parties. So they cannot be given constituency allowances 
because they have no constituencies" (M akoa, 2005: 63).
A nother factor w hich hindered opposition  parties' 
perform ance in 2007 election was the issue of finance as 
alluded to above. Lack of party funding has m ade it difficult 
for opposition parties to m ount aggressive campaigns 
country wide, consequently giving the incum bent LCD 
more m ileage. Party funding is crucial for political parties to 
function efficiently and effectively. In Lesotho, parties were 
given cam paign funding, but not party fund ing for the first
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time during 2002 general elections. This cam paign funding 
is done through the Independent Electoral Com m ission. 
Each political party taking part in this election was given 
M20, 000.00. This m oney was disbursed in two phases; 
firstly, each party w as given M10, 000.00. The rem aining 
amount w as aw arded in proportion to the num ber of 
candidates each party had fielded for the election (M atlosa 
k  Sello 2005). M ost of the opposition parties in Lesotho, like 
the NPP, NIP, PFD and BAC could not even field candidates 
throughout the country during the 2002 elections. The issue 
of party funding in Lesotho has been com plicated by lack of 
legislation. This is because,
...p riv ate fu n d in g  to political parties remains 
unregulated. Lack o f  legislated party fun din g  and 
unregulated private fu n d in g  adversely affects parties 
and their activities. This is more so fo r  opposition  
parties (LPC, BNP, NIP, BAC, PFD) than the ruling 
party LCD, given that the latter does have access to 
public resources by virtue o f  its incum bency (M atlosa &
Sello 2 0 0 5 :4 7 ).
These parties therefore depend heavily on paltry 
contributions from  m em bers. This m eans that they cannot 
undertake their party program m es effectively because these 
subscriptions tend to be unreliable. Financial w eakness is 
one of the m ain lim itations of opposition parties. Sam e 
parties have cited lack of funds as a reason for non­
participation in by-elections.
Lesotho p o litica l situation as far as political parties' 
finances are concerned , is sim ilar to that of Ghana where 
opposition parties have experienced,
...fin an cia l w eakness translated into meagre or non­
existent form al party organisation. None o f  the 
opposition parties in 1995 m aintained offices in all the 
regions or m ost o f  the districts. A t the grassroots, 
these parties were represented, i f  at all, by volunteers
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in makeshift offices or private hom es. O nly the 
governing N D C (National D em ocratic C ongress) had 
offices in all ten regions and in over 90 percen t o f  the 
constituencies (Sandhrook, 2000: 119)
Seven opposition parties in Lesotho have no perm anent 
offices except the main opposition, BN P, BCP and LPC. 
N onetheless, these parties since 2002 election  have not 
m aintained offices in all three regions of the country 
including its districts. The above situation  since 2002, has 
changed only in respect of the ru ling LCD  because it had 
m aintained secretariat services at the constituency  level 
including LPC constituency. Like the N D C in G hana, the 
LCD has been able to service its constitu ents unlike most 
opposition parties w hich lack these facilities.
On the other hand, opposition parties in L esotho appear 
to have failed to develop a viable opposition  to the ruling 
LCD. All the nine opposition parties in the legislature 
during the 2002 parliam ent rem ain d ivided internally  and 
among them selves. They have been unable to think outside 
of the box and find consensus in order to d iscred it the ruling 
partv before prospective voters. These opposition  parties 
appear to have faltered in attracting voters. They remained 
unviable because they have not been able to develop  or offer 
viable policies that will enable them  to attract m ore voters. 
Most of these parties' leadership is com posed  of people with 
primary education and as such have not been able to attract 
requisite expertise. Lack of expertise m akes them  unable to 
develop good policies. Therefore, they p ractice rhetoric 
politics and unable to address real issues. For that reason, "a 
parliam entary opposition w ould only be v iable if it is able to 
weave a policy program m e capable of attracting  the support 
of a diverse set of constituencies, and in particular the 
growing com m unity of independent v o ters" (H abib and 
Taylor 2000: 56).
The other factor that can be accounted for LCD victory 
revolves around the founder leader of LC D  w ho was also a
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founder leader of BCP. M okhehle wielded considerable 
power over the BCP in the early 1950s. He was feared and at 
the sam e tim e w orshipped by both his enem ies and 
followers. A ccording to form er BCP stalwart, Ts'eliso 
Makhakhe', the BCP derives its inspiration and motive 
power from  the philosophy of egalitarianism  and Pan- 
Africanist outlook. The philosophy of egalitarianism  
denotes that the party has a strong peasant base and 
obligation. Its leadership  is uniquely of peasant origin and 
background, and its roots are firmly set in the harsh rural 
environment and experiences rather than in elitist and 
aristocratic circu m stances and com fort.
Since the LCD  broke off from  the BCP, it was also 
alleged that the party took with it these values. It was 
further claim ed that the LCD leaders w ere in good position 
to liberate the peasants, the labouring m asses, the 
unemployed w ith their offspring on the fringes of towns 
and throughout the country from  the vicious cycles of 
ignorance, poverty and w retched m isery for they have 
themselves been born and bred in sim ilar circumstances. 
Again, because of the w isdom  enshrined in the African 
custom of the extended fam ily, they cannot escape 
involvement in the events and experiences affecting the 
next-of-kin and others such as illness, death, weddings, and 
dead m iners' w ives claim ing com pensation or reparation 
from the m ine, ch ild ren 's  schooling and fees, counselling 
and other socio-econom ic problem s. It was these values 
which m ost rural voters appear to have been holding on to 
that m ade the LCD m ore electable in m ost rural 
constituencies.
Third, M okh ehle 's nam e has becom e a brand name. In 
fact, it has becom e a vote winner. It took hard work for 
M okhehle to establish  h im self as a household name in 
Lesotho politics since the late 1940s. It is currently difficult 
to know  o r understand the leader of LCD and the Prime 
Minister M osisili as w ell as his form er Deputy, the leader of 
Lesotho People 's C ongress (LPC) and now the interim
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leader of the A lliance of C ongress Parties (A C P) Kelebone 
M aope in Lesotho politics except for the fact that both  men 
were associated with N tsu M okhehle. The tw o m en are 
quite aw are that they cannot identify them selves before the 
Lesotho voter w ithout invoking M okh ehle 's nam e and most 
im portantly using him  and particularly  his p icture as a vote 
catcher. The dead m an's head is extrem ely  im p ortan t as a 
vote w inner for these parties. This is the m an (M okhehle) 
who devoted his social life and his being to Lesotho politics. 
A nything that bears his nam e is a quick seller to Lesotho 
electorates so the above m en believe. This w as one of the 
reasons why the LCD has been w inning elections because of 
the party 's association w ith M okhehle.
M okhehle's personality cult is as strong as ever. In all 
their public gatherings, both LPC" and LCD  invoke 
M okhehle. Sim ilarly, LPC political N ew s Paper and their 
election sym bol in 2002 w as M okhehle 's head w hile LCD 
New^s paper and election sym bol is an "E agle"(M eaning  
Ntsu "in  the local language" the first nam e of the late 
Leader Ntsu M okhehle). In fact, "N tsu  M okhehle, the 
energetic and w ell educated BAC “‘leader, w as widely 
regarded as a charism atic figure" (W eisfe ld erl999 :8 ). Again, 
all the 27M Ps, who form ed LPC includ ing  M okhehle's 
brother after their defection from  the LCD  in 2001 were 
regarded "as M okhehle's die hard sup p orters w ho have 
been in exile with him  except its cu rrent in terim  leader 
(M osisili) in 2001. Thus, M okh ehle 's personality  cult 
assisted the LCD to win elections in Lesotho. C onversely, all 
parties that broke off from  BCP and LCD  are finding it 
difficult to win elections despite using M okh ehle 's magic 
name other than the LCD. This m eans that there m ight be 
som ething m ore to this LCD victory than the m agic from 
M okhehle. The m ajor question therefore, is w hy voters 
continue to vote for LCD in these elections?
There are m yriad theories in Political science literature. 
Some of these theories can be used to explain  the LCD 
victory. The m ost prom inent are theories of voting
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behaviour. T h ese include but not limited to sociological 
model, w hich em phasises the social groups voting patterns, 
the party id entification  m odel that stresses the individual's 
psychological attachm ent to his environm ent and the 
rational choice m odel w hich argues that voters are rational 
and vote accord ing  to their preferences (D enverl989, 1992, 
D unleavyl990, M iller 1990), is the one the paper will focus 
upon in analysing  the LCD victory in 2007 elections.
The rational choice m odel (RCM ) w hich goes with 
various nam es such as "issu e voting m odel, a value model, 
rational choice theory, rational action theory, a prospective 
model (if votes fit best w ith attitudes towards party policies 
for the future), a retrospective m odel (if votes fit best with 
attitudes tow ards the governm ent's past record in handling 
the econom y, for exam ple, or a leader personality model' 
(Miller1992:53). RCM  is the dom inant theoretical paradigm  
in m icroeconom ics. It is also central to contem porary 
political science thinking. In recent years, the theory has 
more increasingly  been used in political science, sociology 
and other acad em ic disciplines than in econom ics. The 
theory is a paradigm , a hypothesis or a fram ew ork used for 
understanding and often  m odelling a political (social), and 
economic behaviour of individuals. It has had far-reaching 
impacts on the study of political science, especially in fields 
like the study of in terest groups, elections, behaviour in 
legislatures, coalitions, and bureaucracy (D unleavy 1991).
Most m odels have additional assum ptions. Proponents 
of rational ch oice m odels do not claim  that a model's 
assumptions are a full description of reality, only that good 
models can aid reasoning and provide help in form ulating 
falsifiable hypotheses, w hether intuitive or not. Successful 
hypotheses are those that survive em pirical tests (Dunleavy 
1991). It is in this con text that the m odel is used in this paper 
to analyse the 2007 LC D  election victory. In fact, M odels that 
rely on rational choice theory often adopt m ethodological 
individualism, the assum ption that social situations or 
collective beh aviou rs are the result of individual actions.
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W hile m ost m odels of rational choice are very d iverse, they 
share one thing in com m on. They all assum e that 
individuals choose the best action according to stable 
preference functions and constraints facing  them . This 
choice is exercised w henever a voter is confronted  with a 
decision, w hether the snap election or choosing  among 
various parties, the m odel assum es that given this diversity 
of choices the voter will still be able to exercise his or her 
choice by ensuring that he or she derives m axim um  benefits 
from  the choice made. The RCM  applies sam e assum ptions 
used by econom ists in analysing voting behaviour. The 
m odel argues that a consum er " operating  in an econom ic 
m arket has a finely divisible stock of m oney to distribute 
over a wide variety of goods in order to express his or her 
preferences in a sophisticated and gradual w ay"(D unleavy, 
1985: 12). This consum er has only one vote to spend to a 
party that com es closest to his choice and he buys a basket 
full of policies. The m odel does not address the question of 
w here voters got their attitudes of voting from  or how  they 
got them, but focuses on their attitudes and choice in voting. 
It claim s "V oters m ake up their ow n m inds about issues, 
perform ance and personalities and then vote for the party 
that com es closest to delivering the policies and 
perform ance they w ant "(D unleavy, 1990:53). The voters 
individually act rationally w hen choosing to vote for a 
particular party and m axim ise their vote to derive most 
benefits available from  their vote.
Voters have clear know ledge of past record of parties' 
policies and "are  as volatile as shoppers choosing  between 
superm arkets constantly in search of a better 
product"(Crew e 1993:110). The voters have enormous 
inform ation at their disposal. This in form ation  provides 
them with various alternatives in com paring their parties' 
preferences and helps them  in reaching their voting 
decisions. The voters therefore, "after com p arin g  parties 
with their ow n preferred outcom es, they choose the party 
closest to their preferences"(D unleavy, 1985:13). The rational
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voters' v iew s are clearly consistent with political issues. 
They know  roughly w hat options are available by ranking 
these issues and choosing the one w hich best suits voters. 
Therefore, voters, according to this m odel are egoistic and 
entirely self-interested .
Rational decision  m aking entails choosing an action 
given one's preferences, the actions one could take, and 
expectations about the outcom es of those actions 
(http://en.w ikipedia.org/w iki/R ational_choice_theory). 
Actions are often  expressed as a set, for exam ple a set of j  
exhaustive and exclusive actions: A={ m,..., a,-}. For
example, if a person is to vote for either Roger, Sara, or 
abstain, her set of possible voting actions is:
A = {Roger, Sam , abstain}. Individuals can also have sim ilar 
sets of possible outcom es. Rational choice theory m akes two 
assumptions about individuals' preferences for actions. 
First, is the assum p tion  of com pleteness, that is, that all 
actions can be ranked in an order of preference (indifference 
between two or m ore is possible). Second, is the transitivity, 
the assum ption that if action ai is preferred to ai, and action 
ai is preferred to a3, then ai is preferred to a3. Together these 
assumptions form  the result that given a set of exhaustive 
and exclusive actions to chose from, an individual can rank 
them in term s of his/her preferences, and that his/her 
preferences are consistent
(http:// en .w ikipedia.org/ w iki/Rational_choice_theory). 
Nevertheless, there are m any form ulae for this model. This 
paper therefore, is an attem pt to understand why this party 
has been w inning so m any elections (1998, 2002 and 2007) 
despite noticeable political challenges in Lesotho as 
explained below .
The LCD victory  m ay be explained by borrow ing some 
of the im portant aspects of the rational choice m odel above. 
In his analysis of the RCM , Crew (1993) argued that, the 
model involve three different judgm ents about political 
parties. For instance, the issue of unem ploym ent, makes 
voters judge parties by their policies for job creation (policy
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voting), by their degree of em phasis on the problem  at hand 
(priority-voting) or by their past record on unem ploym ent 
(perform ance-voting). The LCD has been vocal in pointing 
out the fact that it has been able to relieve the poor by 
providing free education and pension for the elderly  (Policy 
voting). It also placed m uch em phasis on increasing 
m onthly pension (priority-voting) if voted into pow er again 
and of course the fact that it has been able to create many 
jobs (perform ance-voting) during the their tenure. These 
sim ilarities appeared very close to Crew  analysis above.
The LCD had exploited every possible m eans available 
to increase voters' confidence in the party and also being 
able to convince enough electorates that it w as com petent in 
m anaging the econom y better than other parties. It would 
appear that A BC and other m ajor opposition  parties such as 
the Basotho N ational Party (BNP) and A lliance of Congress 
Parties (ACP) w ere not trusted. This w as sim ilar to 1983 and 
1987 situation in Britain w hereby Labour party and other 
Alliance parties were defeated by C onservative party 
because they w ere seen as divided, adventuristic and 
despite their good policies, voting for them  w as seen as a 
waste vote. In the sam e m anner, the A BC  had just 
fragm ented from  LCD four m onths before polling day as a 
result of intra-party conflict. Sim ilarly , the BN P had just 
experienced a split into Basotho D em ocratic Party (BDNP), 
while A CP w as a coalition of form er congress parties of 
which one of them  broke aw ay from  LCD  before. It can be 
argued therefore, that voters did not have confidence in the 
leadership of these parties, instead, decided to vote for the 
party that they saw  as capable of m anaging the economy, 
just as the British voted conservative party in 1992 instead of 
Labour party on assum ption that C onservative w as more 
capable to run the econom y than Labour. LCD also 
m anaged to raise voters' expectations of being better off 
under the LCD governm ent because expectations played a 
significant role in determ ining the level o f sup p ort for the 
governm ent during the 2007 period.
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N evertheless, the rational choice m odel like all others has 
some problem s. It explains very little about class and 
partisanship de-alignm ent. This m odel is too theoretical and 
very d ifficult to apply in practice because of the nature of 
voters' u npred ictable decisions. The m ajor problem  has 
been that it is often  hard to ascertain w hether a particular 
attitude is a cause of certain  behaviour or these attitudes 
constitute rationalisation. W hen rational m odel is closely 
scrutinised, its case of cause and effect becom es very weak. 
It can only be said that this pocket-book voting m ight have 
likely created conducive conditions for the LCD to win 2007 
general elections, but the evidence available has not been 
com pelling enough to justify this conclusion.
W hile hunger has been a m ajor ABC issue, in its 
manifesto, this policy appears not to have favoured the 
party by attracting  m ore votes. It does not appear to have 
translated into a m ajor swing throughout the country except 
the capital city alone w here the party w on seventeen 
constituencies (IEC 2007 results). W hat was significant in 
this period w as that the rise in unem ploym ent an estim ated 
40 to 45 percent during 2002 parliam ent did inflict a small 
amount of dam age on governm ent's electoral fortunes, 
though clearly  not enough to prevent its re-election. The 
2007 election  reflected a new pattern of attitudes in voting, 
"m ore voters treated elections as an occasion for personal 
choice, not class or parental loyalty "(Budge, 1993: 100) 
among parties in Lesotho. N evertheless, the LCD policies 
appeared to have been instrum ental in influencing voters' 
preferences.
Conclusion
While there are varied explanations for this LCD victory, 
which include am ong others, the position of the 
incum bency, lack of financial resource for opposition 
parties, the legacy of form er Prim e M inister Ntsu M okhehle 
both the founder of BCP and LCD and finally, the rational 
choice theory w hich appears to com e closest in providing a
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plausible explanation of this victory and in illum inating 
patterns of voting behaviour in Lesotho. By the sam e token, 
it should not be assum ed that the m odel is problem  free. All 
in all, criticism s of the flow ering rational choice research 
program  are not com pletely w ithout m erit, but neither are 
they debilitating. G iven the heterogeneity  o f the political 
science profession, it would be surprising  if any one 
approach w on general acceptance. The approach  itself 
rem ains debated by all scholars and in  som e cases such as 
Lesotho, it has been relatively insightfu l w hile in others it 
has provided less than plausible exp lanation  about LCD 
victory. The paper is therefore, part o f the on-going  debate 
about the theory in explaining elections.
In conclusion therefore, we argue that there is evidence, 
which indicates that rational choice m odel had been applied 
in the 2007 elections. M ost rural voters in Lesotho still 
regard the LCD as m ore com petent in m anaging the 
econom y than other parties, hence they prefer to vote for 
this party on assum ption that they w ould be better off 
under the LCD adm inistration w hich ad vocates pension for 
the elderly, free education and econom ic prosperity. 
Therefore, rational choice m odel still p lays a m ajor role in 
voting m ore especially in 2007 elections. Rational choice 
m odel com es closest in explaining w hy the LCD won the 
2007 election.
It is also safe to conclude that the tw o LC D  policies; the 
pension schem e and free education paid dividends to the 
party. These policies appear to have attracted  m ost votes 
especially am ong the poor rural peasants who find 
education expenses too high and pension  schem e as 
supplem enting their near zero incom e from  their poor 
subsistence farm ing. These rural voters regard free 
education as a relief to their dire econom ic status, thus 
pocket book voting was the m ain factor that m ade them to 
vote for the LCD. Indeed, they voted for the party that put 
more m oney in their pockets and they used their votes as
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political m oney to buy policies of the party they preferred as 
Downs (1957) argues above.
It is of course, as rational to vote for an incom e as for a 
pension th at one did not w ork for since m ajority of voters in 
the rural areas are unem ployed and depend to a greater 
extent on both the m onthly pension and free primary 
education or for policies to reduce poverty and im prove 
economic cond itions as the LCD m anifesto prom ised. In 
fact, rational choice theorists would probably regard voting 
for the party best able to advance one's fam ily 's econom ic 
prosperity as rational voting par excellence.
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End N otes
i Mr. Tseliso M akhakhe w as a p rom inent founder m em ber of the BCP in 
the earlv 1950s. H e w ent to exile in Botsw ana w ith M okhehle and others. 
He later b ecam e a M inister of Education  after 1993 and rem ained with  
the BCP after the LCD  broke off in 1997  as the BCP leader.
H LPC fragm ented  from  the LCD  in 2001an d  LCD had fragm ented from  
BCP in 1997. H o w ev er, d u rin g  the 2007  elections the LPC and BAC a 
party w hich also fragm en ted  from  BCP m erged and form ed Allience of 
Congress Parties A C P. This parties still subscribe to the original
Mokhehle B C P id eology.
BCP after its inception  in 1952  w as know n as B asutoland A frican  
Congress and the nam e w as later chan ged  to BCP in the early 1960s.
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